Business and Value

More inspiration in the form of this seminar/discussion by Chris Do about valuing design work.

The problem I’m thinking about is, what is the plausible value of technology research and evaluation to a company or a country? In terms of ‘moving the needle’, this can be estimated – but I suspect the core issue is adoption.

Practically, I need to think about referrals and distribution.


The (Anti)fragility of Work

I have been drawing a kind of spiritual strength from Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile. Taleb’s technical interest is the relationship between volatility and non-linearity. His philosophical interest is in the nature of randomness. His domains of interest are finance, philosophy, medicine, technological growth – basically things subject to convexity effects.

Work (by which I mean the system of industrial employment, and the systems built on that model) is fragile. In trying to be ‘future’-ready (in skills, in graduates, and otherwise), are we not actually fragilizing our system even further?

More pressingly, what is the arbitrage here?

What is the best signal of truly valuable work? The classics are money and mobility, but not everyone (not every single working-age citizen, not every single graduate) will be able to get a large-enough share of these for signalling purposes; money and mobility work as signals because they allow relative discrimination.

I’ve tended to believe in product, but the first system I experienced was thoroughly impaired at validating quality.

(A tangential realization is that, w.r.t. the problem of the value of work, the ability to recognize good work makes an organization or a society antifragile. Anything that undermines this, e.g. a mania for ‘future’-readiness, fragilizes the system.)

I’ve taken stochastic turns, and they’ve led some interesting places; strength and courage.

Against the ‘Post-Fact’ Hypothesis

(Post begun on Wednesday, 9 November 2016, in the post-Trump situation.)


At lunch today, I was struggling to explain my objection to that strain of commentary about post-‘fact’ politics.

Has politics become ‘post-fact’? The mystery from which this strand of commentary begins is that people seem willing to continue their support for politicians who:

  1. Make claims which they know to be false,
  2. Are blatantly inconsistent and self-contradictory, or
  3. Advocate economically and socially costly policies with no clear benefit.

Given these observations, the hypothesis is that people nowadays must simply have less of a concern or capacity for ‘facts’ in politics.

Is that an unreasonable hypothesis? Not exactly – but this initial plausibility is deceptive. In fact, I think its intuitive appeal is precisely what makes ‘post-fact politics’ a cognitively limiting and discursively sterile frame.

My most basic objection to the ‘post-fact’ hypothesis is that it is ripe for confirmation bias. “This is the politics of grievance.” “In the age of reality TV, people can’t distinguish serious content from entertainment.” “Nationalism and nostalgia are resurgent in many places in the world.” “It’s a rural-urban divide,” the sub-text being either, “It’s a tribal divide,” or, “The hicks don’t understand the news.”

From the ‘post-fact politics’ frame, this looks like a convergent pattern, and this seeming convergence creates the illusion that the hypothesis has explanatory power. However, that convergence arises partly because these explanations all serve to affirm a premise implicit to the ‘post-fact’ hypothesis: that my understanding of the parameters of constructive discussion doesn’t need adjustment. With ‘fact’ on my side, disagreements tend to be rationalized as transient differences of concern (temporary and self-correctable deviations from the norms of rational discussion), or as essential and unchangeable differences (mostly, an incapacity for civility or knowledge).


I think it’s revealing that J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy was one of the most extensively covered books about Trump-land in the establishment press. Vance tells a story that is evidently cognitively satisfying for a broad audience. His depiction of difference – framed in terms of class, culture, and other parameters of social situation – seems to have sparked a certain empathetic impulse in his audience (here I quote some of their letters to Rod Dreher, who did an interview with Vance):

  1. “I enjoy intelligent conversation and debate and have learned to carefully listen to and understand those who I may disagree with, so I might be educated fully on the issue not just entrenched in my beliefs […] Thank you for a refreshing read in a sea of partisan sludge.”
  2. “I do think dialog and empathy are something of a short supply in American politics today.”
  3. “I also feel a greater understanding now of the appeal of Trump to certain strata within our society… along with a renewed sense of how dangerous he really is to all of us (not to mention the rest of the world)!”

At the same time,  these three letter-writers also detailed their parameters of difference from (and similarity to ) Vance’s hillbillies:

  1. “By the way I am black, liberal, I most often vote Democrat and I don’t like Trump (for Reasons too high in number to state).”
  2. “I’m Californian, a progressive and a Sanders supporter, a former Nader supporter, a former UAW organizer, currently a medical devices engineer in [state], and have a Ph.D. in engineering. I grew up in a town 5 miles north of the Mexican border in south San Diego, and grew up among Mexican immigrants, many of whom were undocumented… they were my neighbors, my friends, my elders. I myself am an immigrant, came here as a kid with my parents, who were liberals who wanted something better than that right-wing dictatorship in [another country] // But I did grow up around the poverty line. My parents fought hard to stay out of welfare, to stay together, and to teach us the value of work.”
  3. “I speak as a socialist, agnostic, gay white male who’s never voted Republican in all his years! As a lifelong resident of the suburbs of Houston, Texas, it’s long occurred to me how insulated I am from the struggles of poor and working-class folks today; however my family started out poor, with my parents divorcing when I was six.”

All three writers testify to having experienced a moment of empathy, sparked by an appreciation of the social differences they detail – and to the extent that empathy extends the imagination, that’s a positive.

On the other hand, the media coverage of the book left me with a nagging suspicion about how far this particular mode of empathy will go, in terms of changing the terms of engagement across ideological lines.

While the NYT managed to remain mostly nuanced, the sub-title on the National Review’s piece was: ‘A harrowing portrait of the plight of the white working class’. What strikes me about that sub-title is the clear emotional valence of it (it borders on sentimental), and the equally clear moral/political valence.

That clarity is cognitively satisfying, but rather than extend the imagination, I think it undermines it and deceives it. It promises that your categories work, and that your sympathy bridges the gap.

As for whether Vance’s book itself manages to bridge the empathy gap, I think this reviewer’s suggestion that ‘Vance is very skilled at generalizing from very small pieces of evidence’ is worth weighing as well – really his suggestion is that generalization is Vance’s primary skill, and that in his evaluation, Vance hasn’t actually represented the challenges and situation of the region very faithfully at all.If he had, it would probably have been a different book; but would Vance’s Elegy have been as enthusiastically received among such broad constituencies if he’d generalized less? If not, then perhaps it can’t be expected to reconfigure those fundamental alignments very much either.


At lunch, we got to talking about how ‘fact’ is also discursively bound and socially constructed – always a bit of a morass…

The case I was struggling to make was that the psychology of those constituencies that get cast as ‘post-fact’ isn’t necessarily reducible to hindbrain-driven tribal behavior, or to a desire for emotional gratification/validation. Considering things from a different angle, Trump’s blatant self-contradictions (“I love the Mexican people”) at least signal the ability to consider those objections that the better-informed seemed to ignore. That’s a powerful signal, if your disagreements and your ‘facts’ seem never to be represented, only ever misrepresented, and never responded to in a way that means something to you. Trump voters get cast as either haters or suckers – because isn’t that what they have to be, if they’re swallowing what Trump’s selling? – but there is an alternative: that perhaps ‘they’ also have a capacity for cultural theory, media studies, and criticism.

I really don’t think the genius of Trump is his unusual syntax (try reading that Slate article, and see if it doesn’t strike you as condescending) – if anything, it was his ability to resist commentators’ power to represent him at all.

Not that I put it in exactly those terms; still, the reply I got was that his constituency can’t be that sophisticated.


Once, I took a series of buses across half the U.S., from Minnesota down to Tennessee. I went on my own with food, clothes, and a tent, to get to a music festival.

Being at the festival was a strange mix of the familiar and the alien. In some sense, I was the alien in the middle of a gigantic farm in Tennessee. On the other hand, part of how I got there involved feeling convinced on some level that I knew what I was going to be experiencing: the bands, the songs, the fans.

Adding to that strangeness was the fact that places like music festivals are also where signs and icons come to life. Imagine the memes and reposts on a trending topic, except people are waving the signs and shouting the words, wearing the costumes or carrying the near-life-size dummies, etc.

As I was settling in over the first two days, the music was familiar. I watched Real Estate and CHVRCHES and James Blake. I noticed a few things that were unfamiliar, though, like the meme, ‘Do you like fishsticks, Kanye?’ (I found out later that this was from South Park.)

I knew Kanye was due to play at the main stage on the third day, but I hadn’t been aware of his history with the festival – to cut a long story short, in 2008 a series of scheduling and technical missteps trapped a late-night crowd in a field for a few hours, with the crowd working itself into a mutinous mood that inspired some heartfelt graffiti.

But being unaware of the historical context, the anti-Kanye messages I was noticing presented something of a puzzle.

Another puzzle: Does enthusiastically voicing an effigy of South Park Kanye for three days make you the opposite of a fan, or the best fan?

I ended up watching Kanye’s show with a couple of grad students from the University of Tennessee. I asked them about why they were watching Kanye, and if the crowd really hated him, or if it was something else. I heard that Kanye was classic, and that Kanye was complex, and that, for both Kanye and the crowd, hate was also about self-hate. I also heard about how Kanye had paid Zach Galifianakis and Seth Rogen to parody him in the past (both true).

In my head, I theorized about Kanye’s performance of egotism, and the heroic aspect to the role of rejected villain. From the stage, there were some amazing monologues.


Another response I got at lunch to what I was saying, was that ‘post-fact’ is essentially the construction of deviance. I thought my friend was right, but that it might be a problem if the ideological establishment’s central project is effectively the construction of the thoughts and responses of nearly half the country as deviant.

One area in which I thought I might agree with the suggestion that we have a post-‘fact’ politics was the idea that the central political controversy has become, ‘Whose facts?’ But in a way, maybe that makes ‘post-fact politics’ just politics. Maybe this is just what groups do, what politicians do, and how politics happens.

An interesting idea that Alexio Mantzarlis raises is that ‘at any point in history we can find politicians vandalizing our understanding of reality’. The idea is that the ‘post-fact’ hype is just the perennial condition of political discourse, rather than a novel situation. That politicians make representations that suit their constituencies’ situations is a given. Some representations may be more or less self-interested, and more or less equitable to their non-constituents, but at some level conflicting representations are just part of the process.

An alternative statement of the ‘post-fact’ situation is that the norms that defined the political discourse seem no longer able to accommodate the divergences in discourse – but maybe that’s just how polities evolve.

So maybe it really is just that (I quote a friend), ‘The era of centrism and logics of depoliticized technocratic management in all its manifestations is over,’ which just about covers everything I’ve tried to say about ideology and the discourse around ‘fact’, the ‘fact’-bound, and the people who feel they must own their own ‘facts’.


I think one trap for the progressively minded is that there does come a point when your reference points erode and your slogans change direction. Things like ‘difference’ become templatic, and lose their meaning when their dimensions of reference become incomprehensible.

However, my speaking against the ‘post-fact’ hypothesis isn’t intended as an admonition to arrogant liberals (or any particular group – I truly believe that the inertia of human imagination is a universal tendency). Not all divergences in dimensions-of-reference may be resolvable; some incompatibilities may well be fundamental, and perhaps that’s the basis of all political struggle.

But that’s also why I find that the ‘post-fact’ hypothesis has a cynical dimension, in its passive acceptance of incompatibility.

Mantzarlis (an expert on fact-checking!) is a fellow skeptic of the ‘post-fact’ hype, and in an article from July 2016, he offers this analysis:

‘To some extent, “post-fact” is a coping mechanism for commentators reacting to attacks on not just any facts, but on those central to their belief system. When the political realities are as alien to a liberal-cosmopolitan worldview as Donald Trump’s candidacy or Brexit, it can be easier to explain them away by painting 2016 as an apocalyptic “post-truth” era where people are just not getting the importance of facts.

‘This is not to say there are no grounds to worry. This has clearly been an acrimonious year for politics on both sides of the Atlantic. Facts are getting a thorough shellacking by campaigns which don’t think they matter to the electorate. In the UK, a key donor for the “Leave” campaign said as much, while a supporter of Donald Trump called fact-checking an “out-of-touch, elitist media-type thing” (even that has echos of 2012).’

There’s a lot in there for me to agree with, but I think the point that came out the most clearly for me was about how certain campaigns treated the electorate. Ultimately I think the thing I most actively object to about the ‘post-fact’ hypothesis is that it is a surrender to the cynics.


‘We did not see that our slogans had lost their bearing and pointed in the wrong directions. We invoked “democracy” solemnly as in a prayer, and watched while the greatest nation of Europe voted, by perfectly democratic methods, its assassins into power. We worshipped the will of The Masses, and their will turned out to be death and self-destruction. We regarded capitalism as an outworn system, and were willing to exchange it for a new form of slavery. We preached tolerance, and the evil which we tolerated destroyed our civilization.’
Arthur Koestler, “The Chinaman’s Nod”, in Bricks to Babel.

Bricks to Babel is a collection of Koestler’s writings, many of them short pieces. “The Chinaman’s Nod” is a very short piece, about Koestler’s posting to Berlin as a journalist. Koestler arrived in Berlin on September 14, 1930, the day of the election in which the National Socialists dramatically increased the number of seats they held to 107 of 577, from just 12 seats before. Koestler refers to the day as ‘the beginning of the age of barbarism in Europe’.

“The Chinaman’s Nod” is primarily about a disjuncture between the imagined state of political manoeuvres and political discourse, and the actual behavior of the body politic.

Much of the piece takes the form of a depressing run-down of how the various groups that might have been expected to challenge and arrest the rise of the Nazis – e.g. the Liberals, the Socialists, the intellectuals, the Communists – could not (or did not, until the point it was too late), either because their credibility with the people was poor, or because they were apt to operate in an ineffectual way.

If the disjuncture I described above was the problem, the natural question to ask is about how this disjuncture came to be. Koestler’s answer might refer to the preoccupation of politicians (and others) with issues they thought were important, their failure to recognize real danger, etc. However the underlying pathology he diagnoses isn’t something specific to some subset of citizens; as he writes,

‘After the event, people asked themselves: How could we have been such fools to twiddle our thumbs when the outcome was so obvious? The answer is that owing to the inertia of human imagination, to most people it wasn’t obvious at all.’

I read Koestler’s suggestion of the existence of some sort of ‘inertia of human imagination’ as a reference to something we are all subject to.


What does the talk about political dysfunction look like nowadays? Words like ‘gridlock’ and ‘polarized’ tend to come up when discussing the health of the world’s super-powered democracy. (A body out of balance, and in need of a cleanse, maybe.) People speculate about how the mysterious algorithms behind things like Facebook’s News Feed create political echo chambers for individuals who are subsequently surprised to find that people who don’t share their views actually exist, and in significant numbers. We worry about the fragmentation of discourse, and wonder if it adds up to a coherent imagination of community.

At home, terms like ‘silent majority’ and ‘the 70%’ come up, sometimes (I get the feeling) from people who seem like they feel disappointed or even betrayed that those who disagreed with them failed to do so in terms more to their liking, in media they prefer. At least ours is a small country.

Earlier I asked the question about how the disjuncture between the imagined state of political discourse and who people actually end up voting for comes to be. While I agree with Koestler that it’s often an imaginative gap, when I think about ‘discourse’ and what makes a ‘healthy’ political discourse, one way to think about it is in terms of who gets heard and who gets ignored. There’s also the question of how we hear, which is both a practical question (what do we tend not to hear/read/watch?) and a question of whether we are aware of our cognitive biases (what do we tend not to understand?).

I actually came across the first passage from Koestler I quoted above on the same day I saw news of J.K. Rowling’s defense of Trump’s right to expression on my FB feed. In truth, I don’t think Mr. Trump needs much help on the media air-time front; can he even be silenced? She might say the question is not whether he can be silenced, but whether he ought to be silenced, and I would have to agree. 

But even in that discussion, I’m not sure the principle of freedom of expression should be uniformly invoked to defend the speech of the powerful as compared to the speech of the vulnerable. Really I think the urgent question is, Whom have we not heard, that we need to hear?

The vulnerable always need advocates, I think; but there are also the ‘not-as-loud’, who might not need advocates, exactly, but whom I think of as having a hard time being understood through the noise. Trump’s voice gets represented, but what about his supporters’? In a democracy where these ‘not-as-loud’ might be the majority, the cost of either not hearing them, or hearing them but not understanding them, may be dear.

Wherefore art thou Singlish?

An NYT article by Gwee Li Sui about Singlish has been making the rounds this weekend, following the news from earlier this week about Singlish lexical items being added to the OED.

Being a student of the linguistics of Singlish, as well as something of a Singlish advocate (read: I generally like to talk about Singlish to anyone I think might be interested), both were welcome pieces of news.

But I was also motivated to add some comments of my own, after Haikel’s repost of Alfian’s critical comments, about Alfian’s comments as well as the NYT article.

1. ‘there is no standard Singlish’ (Alfian)

True enough: ‘standard’ is difficult to sanction1; and yet there is something that people recognize to be Singlish when they speak it and hear it.

I know I’m used to the idea that there is a Singlish grammar, and though I would agree that this is an idea deserving of critical scrutiny, I don’t think this is a difficult idea to validate.

Is there a Singlish grammar? I think we do use Singlish systematically, and there are clearly ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ ways to use it (among a given group, at a given time: language is always changing, quickly or slowly, in small ways or large). It is true that our use of it admits a greater range of variation than languages which have been more thoroughly codified, but even when we encounter variation the intuition is that some specific parameters have been varied, rather than suspect that the speaker is speaking not-Singlish, or is speaking Singlish wrongly.

Overall I think it is probably true that ‘there will be differences in the Singlish spoken by a Malay speaker, Chinese speaker or Indian speaker’, and, Alfian contends, ‘mainly in the vocabulary used’. Beyond vocabulary, I think even some grammatical constructions are more frequently used by speakers with different linguistic backgrounds as well, for instance in how indefinite subjects are introduced, e.g. ‘Got one man looking for you just now,’ vs. other ways of expressing the same proposition – but even with this example, it is not the case that a person who wouldn’t use this construction as his/her first choice wouldn’t understand the sentence, or judge it to be ungrammatical by whatever Singlish standards (that word again) they provisionally hold.

To take up the point on vocabulary, is there a Singlish lexicon? Whereas I am personally convinced that Singlish is structurally systematic and would defend the idea, I would be much less eager to attempt to designate the boundaries of a Singlish lexicon. Whether a word is a ‘Singlish’ word, as compared to being simply a Hokkien/Malay/etc. word, or ‘from’ one of these languages, is much more contentious.

I’ve also observed how Malay words like ‘koyak’ and ‘rosak’ end up being appropriate for different things for Singlish speakers who speak Malay, as compared to Singlish speakers who don’t speak Malay (mainly Chinese speakers; I actually collected data about this, based on prompting speakers to make judgments about when these words apply, in response to being shown pictures of dysfunctional objects). Whereas I learned that ‘koyak’ means something like ‘torn’ in Malay, and would apply more to, say, a deteriorating old book or a threadbare shirt, the non-Malay speakers thought it applied best to more solid or mechanical things like a keyboard or a chair.

So I think in general a good question to ask is where are we situated, relative to where our nominally ‘Singlish’ words are from, e.g. the examples of Hokkien that Alfian identified as having been presented as examples of Singlish. Growing up not speaking Hokkien, I would have likewise been prone to identifying Hokkien expressions with Singlish as well, and to that extent I found Gwee’s take on the matter, that ‘Singlish’s status grew so powerful that the Chinese dialects took refuge in it to re-seed themselves’, to ring true.

As concerns the lexicon, I could say either that the Singlish lexicon is capacious, implying that the language has somehow ‘integrated’ the vocabulary and made them ‘native’ to the platform, in some sense; or that it is really quite limited, and Singlish speakers simply accommodate the use of non-Singlish words all the time. Falling somewhere in between, one might say that it is a thoroughly bastardized language, with the latter situation contributing to the reality of the former – which would make it much like English, Singlish’s primary lexifier.

2. ‘Its syntax is drawn partly from Chinese, partly from South Asian languages.’ (Gwee)

In fact, based on the most credible linguistic scholarship (Bao 2005, Sato 2014, some others), I would say that Sinitic and Malay languages had the clearest influences on syntax.

Of the authors I cited, Bao rated the influence of Sinitic languages (Mandarin Chinese, but also Hokkien, Teochew, maybe Cantonese) as being primary, but others (like Sato) contest this and point to the influence of other local non-Sinitic languages.

South Asian languages have definitely provided lexical items that Singlish speakers use, but whereas the influence of Sinitic languages and Malay languages has been demonstrated in the literature, the influence of South Asian languages has not. That said, I can’t rule it out, not having examined the structure of South Asian languages in detail myself. Which brings us to:

2a. ‘any authority on Singlish needs to be fluent in at least four languages so as to avoid any kinds of biases that might arise from his or her own linguistic background’ (Alfian)

I agree with this, as far as the problem is making claims about which substrate languages are the most major influences on the grammar of Singlish, in which case we should have surveyed a good range of potential influences, or refer/defer to relevant sources.

On the other hand, being able to speak a language isn’t necessarily the standard a linguist would hold for being able to understand things about a language; there are many ways to think about languages, and many things about language to be interested in understanding.

The conceit of the linguist who studies the structural organization of language (I would say all linguists rely on this, but to varying degrees) is that we can understand the interrelation of grammatical systems on an abstract, universal level. A syntactician would also probably agree that having such an understanding of a language is materially different from mastering the language, but I think this shows that these are simply different knowledges. It is often the case, for instance, that someone working intensively on Javanese syntax gains some ability to converse in Javanese, but in presenting the work to someone who works on, say, Somali, the fact that the linguist studying Somali doesn’t speak Javanese is not assumed to be an impediment. If there is a difficulty, it would suggest that the data from Javanese either isn’t the most relevant to the proposed problem, or that it’s just poorly analyzed.

In trying to make sense of Singlish – what it is, where it comes from – the concept of a ‘contact language’ comes to mind. I might start an explanation with: Singlish is a language formed in a contact situation. Some of the languages (Sinitic languages, Malay) we regard as being part of the substrate, and the lexifier language (English) is regarded as the superstrate.

In looking at the syntax of Singlish, one gets the sense of an organic hybridity.

When it comes to contact languages, researchers are often interested to observe what features of the substrate end up featuring in the contact language. One situation we refer to is substrate transfer2, which is when a certain grammatical structure or system from the substrate language is reproduced in the contact language.

Another situation we refer to is substrate reinforcement, which is when a certain grammatical structure or system is found in more than one of the major substrate languages. This could have a stabilizing effect (i.e. the feature is more likely to be retained over time), and I would speculate that it probably even promotes transfer in the first place (though some may object to me tying reinforcement with transfer).

A related idea is congruency, which is when a structure is found in both the substrate and the superstrate. This is also thought to facilitate transfer.

When talking about contact languages, the term ‘contact ecology’ tends to come up, and I find that thinking about an idea like substrate reinforcement involves the kind of thinking that tries to discern and evaluate the contribution of multiple factors that give rise to the more-or-less equilibrium state of affairs.

The idea of ‘equilibrium’ also reflects the idea that the situation under examination is fundamentally dynamic: the idea I mentioned earlier about language always changing features in historical linguistics, but is also especially pertinent to contact languages.

From the work I’ve seen about Singlish syntax, I’m convinced that patterns of imperfect reinforcement and levelling give rise to a grammar that is fundamentally hybrid. Alfian cites the example of the deletion of the copular verb (‘is’, ‘are’), which he observes in Malay, but which is also found in Chinese, and which is why I think copula deletion has stuck around. Alfian’s example is, ‘They tired already but still want to play,’ (diorang dah penat tapi masih nak main), and in Chinese, I might say, ‘他们累了还要玩’ (plural-pronoun tired already still want play).

The grammar is also still changing, because some patterns of either reinforcement or congruence leave room for ambiguity3.

TL;DR: How Singlish is spoken does vary, but I think there is a core Singlish grammar. The syntax of Singlish is hybrid.

1. As some contend, the idea of ‘standard’ itself as applied to the languages people speak is always problematic: standards are institutions, but (fortunately) people seem to dislike hewing to just one institution at a time, all the time. 

2. Bao 2005 argues that, for instance, the aspectual system of Chinese can be observed in Singlish, though not every element was perfectly translated. (An example: Perfective aspect is marked by ‘already’ in Singlish, e.g. ‘He eat already.’ In Chinese, I might say ‘他吃了,’ which is, character-by-character, ‘male-pronoun eat perfective-aspect’. We mark tense in English morphologically, e.g. ‘He has eat-en,’ or, ‘He ate,’ and we don’t usually think of aspect as being tied into the grammar of English, but we can indicate aspect with words like ‘earlier’ or with constructions like ‘has finished eating’.)

3. An example: some speakers I consulted thought the sentence, ‘A man wore jacket,’ was not just odd, but outright ungrammatical, while other speakers thought it was perfectly fine. I hypothesized it was about an ambiguity about whether ‘a man’ should be analyzed as a subject or topic, which would affect whether a mechanism from English should be given precedence.


  • BAO ZHIMING (2005). The aspectual system of Singapore English and the systemic substratist explanation. Journal of Linguistics, 41, pp 237-267.
  • YOSUKE SATO (2014). Argument ellipsis in Colloquial Singapore English and the Anti-Agreement Hypothesis . Journal of Linguistics, 50, pp 365-401.

Week 8 (Thursday): Characterizing NPs in the Data

All has not been idle on this front, though I did go through two very uncertain weeks, which were followed by two weeks of reorientating and conceptualizing.

I’m using this blog again to just sort out some thoughts from looking through the data I am compiling. I don’t think I will be able to exhaustively tag everything, but I need to note some general trends and describe how some of the categories are emerging.

Possessive Determiners

At least from a quick first look, possessive determiners (pd) are the most common NPs. Their properties tend to be [+def, +spec]. This preference is really quite evident. Possibly worth comparing to CoSiB corpus – actually may not be too difficult to implement a search, since pd is a closed class. If it is super common, this would be a variational feature of note, that definiteness gets marked this way preferentially, over the article.

Unusual nouns and N-Ellipsis

I haven’t been able to find that many unmarked bare common nouns which are ambiguously (in)definite. Many are mass or kind nouns, or seemingly proper nouns. A possible exception is ‘O’-level, which seems like a proper noun, but part of the case for interpreting it as a common noun being that it can be pluralized – but probably that won’t work. It usually means ‘~ results’ or ‘~ exams’, too, so it’s easier to interpret it as N-ellipsis (nominal ellipsis).


Pro-drop is very prevalent, even in mid-sentence. Comparing mid-sentence Pro-drop with the usual kinds of ellipsis in English, we see that it is usually verbs, modals, their respective phrases, dependent clauses, or entire clauses that are gapped or sluiced – but not NPs.

‘Got’ construction

Some sentences are structured, ‘Got NP?’, and it seems like pro drop applies, i.e. ‘e got NP?’ However, ‘Got NP’ can also be in the topic position, e.g. ‘Got one time they went KL.’ ‘Got’ in the latter construction functions in a way comparable to expletive-‘There’.


Abandoned this post half-way; I decided I probably should not do an exhaustive analysis of trends, since there are too many dimensions and too much data to tag.

Now it’s Week 10, essentially. I’m about 5k words in on the Overleaf document. Some ways to go.

Week 6 (Sunday): NVA

Read some of Baker 2008, and his proposal for a universal three-way distinction between nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Not hard to get behind. Interesting stuff about the unique situations you’ll find adjectives in as well. Makes it easier to talk about lexical items being flexibly recategorized, if there are categories we can assume exist. (Or to rule this out.)